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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J
Case No. 900212-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

i

V*

i

GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ,

\

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

\

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for injury to a
jail or other place of confinement, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1990), in the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, the Honorable
Boyd Bunnell, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court improperly admit defendant's

offensive statements made to a police officer over defendant's
objections of irrelevancy and prejudice; and did defendant waive
his objections at trial to the admitting of such statements by
failing to timely raise the objection prior to trial by a motion
to suppress?

Determinations on the admissibility of evidence

will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).

State v.

The issue of waiver must

be determined as a matter of law. State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965,
967-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

Did the court improperly deny defendant's motion to

sever his trial from that of codefendant?

The refusal to grant a

motion to sever will not be overturned absent abuse of
discretion.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440f 445 (Utah 1986);

State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 876, 898 (Utah 1986).
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

request for a jury instruction on what constitutes "injury to a
jail11 on the grounds that defendant's definition of "injury"
required a showing of damage in excess of that required by the
statute?

An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury

instructions presents a question of law.

Carpet Barn v. State of

Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The trial court's

legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is
reviewed for its correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).
4.

Did the trial court improperly refuse defendant's

request for an included offense instruction on criminal mischief
on the grounds that an acquittal on "injury to a jail" would
necessarily entail acquittal on criminal mischief?

Because this

issue presents a question of law, it should be reviewed under the
standard set forth in paragraph three, above.
5.

Should this Court review the host of alleged

statutory and constitutional violations raised by defendant for
the first time on appeal, unbriefed and without specification or
citation to the record, in connection with defendant's claim that

-2-

he was unlawfully denied a free copy of a transcript of his
preliminary hearing?
appellate court.

Discretion to review lies within the

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah

1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986); State v.
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989).

If this Court should

undertake review, was defendant denied equal protection of the
law by the trial court's refusal to provide him with a free copy
of a transcript of his preliminary hearing when an audible tape
recording was available for copying at no charge?

Because this

issue presents a question of law, it should be reviewed under the
standard set forth in paragraph three, above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gregory Lynn Jaimez, and two co-defendants
were charged by information with injuring a jail, a third degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1990) and reckless
burning, a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6104(1)(a) (1990) (R. 2). Subsequently, the reckless burning
charge was dismissed as to all defendants (R. 7). A preliminary
hearing was held, and thereafter, defendant made a motion for an
order for production of the preliminary hearing transcript. (R.
11-13).

Defendant's motion was heard and denied on February 20,

1990 (Transcript of February 20, 1990, hereinafter "TA." 9-11).
On March 9, 1990, defendant filed a motion for continuance and a
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motion to sever his trial from that of codefendant Jerry Lee
Adderman and Kenneth Mark Smith (R. 18-25).

The motions were

denied in a telephone conference between the court and counsel on
March 13, 1990 (R. 32). On March 14, 1990, defendant filed a
motion in limine seeking to prohibit prosecution witnesses from
making any reference to certain of defendant's statements on
grounds of non-relevance and prejudice (R. 28-9).

The trial

court refused to hear this motion (see trial court's handwritten
note at R. 28). After a trial on March 14 and 15, a jury found
defendants Jaimez and Adderman guilty of the charged offense, and
defendant was sentenced to a term of zero (0) to five (5) years
in the Utah State Prison, to commence following his present term
of incarceration (R. 62 and 65 and R. of Adderman, 46). Notice
of appeal was filed on April 13, 1990 (R. 67).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 7, 1989, correction officer, Jay Nelson,
Carbon County Sheriff's Office, was alone on duty in the Carbon
County jail (T. 49-50).

At approximately 11:30 p.m. Nelson heard

a disturbance on the second level.

Investigating, he found some,

if not all, of the seven inmates then incarcerated, including
defendant, in a common area (T. 56). Defendant asked to make a
phone call and Nelson refused.

Nelson then demanded defendant

and the other inmates go to bed to which defendant answered, "No.
Make us."

Nelson then called for assistance (T. 57-8).

Shortly

afterward officers Jerry Cowan and Steven Raber appeared and
conducted all prisoners to their cells without any problem (T.
59).

The three officers then went downstairs (T. 60).
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Within five or six minutes the officers observed water
issuing from the squad room ceiling.

They went upstairs and

found the cellblock floor flooded with approximately four to five
inches of water.

After turning off the water to the cells, the

officers again returned downstairs (T. 60-62).

Shortly

thereafter, the officers observed bright moving flashes,
indicating heat sources, on the television monitors trained on
the cell block area containing defendant and codefendant
Adderman.

Ascending again, they found books burning (T. 66-69).

The inmates were removed to the drunk tank, and the jail
sergeant, officer Robert Kraync was summoned (T. 70).
Officer Cowan testified that the inmates behaved
boisterously while being removed to the drunk tank (T. 107).
Over defendant's objections he was permitted to testify to
defendant's offensive statements (T. 110). Raber also testified
that defendant spoke abusively to him (T. 121), and was the most
vocal of the inmates, hollering, "Don't give up, you guys, now"
(T. 123). John Palacios, an inmate sharing cell #2 with
codefendant Adderman (T. 161), testified that defendant said,
"Let's show what we can do, because we're pissed off," followed
by, "Let's flood the jail" (T. 162).
As to the source of the flooding, Nelson testified that
each cell had a toilet and sink operated by a push button within
that cell (R. 70-71).

Raber testified that he removed a roll of

toilet paper from defendant's commode (T. 124). Cowan testified
that the toilet in cell #1, defendant's cell, was overflowing and
that toilet paper was stuffed in the commode and sink (T. 111).
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Kraync testified that he saw enough debris in the sinks of cells
#1 and 2 to plug them up (T. 140); and Palacios witnessed
Adderman plug the toilet in cell #2 with a roll of toilet paper
received from defendant (T. 164-165).

Palacios also testified

that he believed the toilets in all four cells were being flushed
(T. 166).
All four officers testified to damage caused by the
water to the ceiling in the squad room (T. 71, 102, 125 and 133).
Cowan testified that the entire ceiling and all the light
fixtures in the squad room had to be replaced (T. 112). In
cross-examination defendant and codefendant elicited from Cowan
and Kraync that the flooding resulted in damage only to the squad
room (T. 117, 151).
Nelson testified concerning the physical layout of the
jail as follows:

The jail facility is a two-story building

within the Sheriff's Office complex (T. 51, 54-5).

Four cells,

an isolation cell ("drunk tank") and other facilities are located
upstairs (T. 51). On the first floor, immediately below the
four-cell area is the booking area and squad room (T. 53). There
are also two more cells on the first floor (T. 53). The door
entering the booking area is locked at all times.

The booking

area communicates with the jailer's office and then the squad
room which is next to the two-cell area (T. 54). The Sheriff's
Office complex has another entry, the inner door of which is
locked.

The hallway beyond the inner door leads to the squad

room and booking area (T. 55).
As to whether the "jail" had been damaged, Cowan
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testified that the squad room was used for "jail purposes" when
inmates consulted with their attorneys or used the phone to call
bondsmen (T. 104). In addition, Kraync testified that prisoners
were booked in the squad room and that they were interviewed
there by Adult Probation and Parole.

He also testified that

prisoners were not free to leave that area, that an officer
oversaw the exit door during the day shift hours and that
prisoners could be shut in the squad room behind a locked door
(T. 132-33).
In cross examining Cowan, defendant elicited that the
squad room was only used as a place of confinement when prisoners
were actually confined there (T. 113). Defendant elicited from
Nelson that the squad room is a multipurpose room which could be
used by officers during and after their shifts to visit and that
attorneys were able to go into that room and had full access to
it.

Defendant also elicited that anyone could leave the building

by pushing a release button located next to the exit door, and
further, that the squad room had once been used for a celebration
honoring the promotion of a sheriff to which the general public
had been invited (T. 76-78)•
Defendant testified that he told the other inmates not
to give Cowan and Raber any problems; that he gave Adderman a
roll of toilet paper; and that he also hollered concerning
Nelson's denying him the use of the telephone.

He also testified

that although mad about his not being able to make another phone
call, he did not make any statements about the officers' wives,
nor did he plug up the sink or toilet or run water out of the
toilet (T. 196-199).
-7-

Adderman did not take the stand.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant's offensive statements were presumably
admitted as circumstantial evidence of intent to do injury to the
jail, and defendant failed to specify how he was prejudiced.
Even if those statements were improperly admitted because more
prejudicial than probative, the error was not substantially
influential in bringing about defendant's guilty verdict based on
the weight of evidence against him.

Five witnesses testified

consistently to defendant's leadership and participation in the
flooding of the jail. Also, defendant neither moved for an order
to suppress the offensive statements within five (5) days prior
to trial, nor timely filed his motion in limine, as required by
law.
POINT II
Defendant's motions to sever and to continue were
properly denied.

The motion lacked adequate and sufficient

testimonials that codefendant's alleged testimony would either be
offered or even be favorable.

There was only scant evidence at

trial that both defendants adopted mutually exclusive and
irreconcilable defenses. All the evidence adduced at trial was
pertinent to trying both defendants.

Finally, the State's

"tardy" delivery of codefendant's allegedly exculpating letter,
upon which defendant based his motions, was at most harmless
error because the letter was unauthenticated and thereby
insufficient to support defendant's motions.
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POINT III
Defendant's request for a jury instruction pertaining
to "injury to a jail" was properly refused based on a plain
reading of the statute which is intended to promote the
legislature's general purpose to severely punish those doing
damage to a jail.

The trial court properly employed both a

common sense understanding and a standard definition of "injury"
in providing the correct jury instructions.
POINT IV
Defendant's request for a lesser included instruction
of malicious mischief was properly refused.

Based upon the

court's reasonable interpretation of the statute providing for
the charged offense and the evidence adduced at trial, defendant
could not have been acquitted of the crime charged and convicted
of the "included" offense.

Further, defendant failed to

introduce evidence which would have provided the jury with a
basis for convicting defendant of the "included" offense.
POINT V
All of the violations alleged in Point V of defendant's
brief are raised for the first time on appeal.

Further,

defendant has not briefed a single assignment of error, nor
specified precisely how he was actually harmed by not having a
preliminary hearing transcript, nor even cited to the record.
For all these reasons, this Court should decline to review
defendant's claim that he was unlawfully denied his right to a
free copy of a transcript of his preliminary hearing.
event this Court undertakes review on this point, only
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In the

defendant's claim that he was denied equal protection of the law
merits consideration.

An indigent defendant is not entitled to a

free copy of a preliminary hearing transcript if there is
available to him an alternative substantially equivalent to a
transcript.
charge.

Here, audible tape recordings were available at no

Thus, it was not error to deny defendant a free

transcript.

The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a

free copy of the preliminary hearing is affirmable because it was
ultimately supported upon proper grounds.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S OFFENSIVE STATEMENT AS
EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO INJURE A JAIL. EVEN IF
SUCH STATEMENTS WERE INFLAMMATORY, THEY WERE
RELEVANT AND INSIGNIFICANT IN THE LIGHT OF
EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly
admitted offensive statements he allegedly made to officer Cowan
on the grounds that they were irrelevant and prejudicial and
admitted without a proffer (T. 102, 110). The argument is
insufficient under the law.
All relevant evidence is generally admissible and
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.

Utah R. Evid. 402. The

trial court is given broad discretion in the manner of conducting
a trial and especially in the manner of receiving evidence.
State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1977).

The general

rule is that the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed
unless it has been shown that it abused its discretion.
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).
-10-

State v.

In the instant case, defendants were charged with
injury to a jail or place of confinement, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-8-418 (1990).

Section 76-8-418 is part of that

chapter within the Criminal Code providing for offenses against
the administration of government, as opposed to mere offenses
against property.

Defendant's statements to Cowan (T. 110),

given the context in which they were made, were a clear
expression of anger and frustration suggesting an intent to do
damage to whomever and whatever was restricting his freedom.
Here, the court might reasonably have considered the offensive
statements circumstantial evidence of defendant's state of mind
with respect to those who managed his confinement and his
consequent intent to injure the jail.
Relevant evidence may be excluded if substantially more
prejudicial than probative.

Utah R. Evid. 403.

State v. Lopez,

626 P.2d 483, 485-86 (Utah 1981) (testimony of defendant's having
kicked another man, while inflammatory, not prejudicial where
relevant to defendant's credibility).
In this case however, defendant has made no showing of
any actual prejudice as a result of his statements to Cowan being

Defendant also assigns as error the trial court's failure to
give a lesser included instruction on criminal mischief pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990) (Appellant's Brief at 29-31).
That section provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if:
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or
destroys the property of another.
The subdivision evidently applies to all structures and is not
particularly directed to public buildings.
-11-

admitted.
Even if the statements were erroneously admitted, the
error is harmless.

In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988),

the Utah Supreme Court laid out the harmless error standard:
In State v. Bannerf we applied rule 30 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
nonconstitutional evidentiary error. That
rule directs in part, "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded." To the same effect is
rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The Court in State v. Bishopf unanimously
held that whether reversible error occurs
under rule 30 is determined by applying the
test found in State v. Fontana. In Fontanaf
we held that "affect the substantial rights
of a party" means that an error warrants
reversal "only if a review of the record
persuades the [C]ourt that without the error
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant.'" In
Knightf the Court adopted an "erosion-ofconfidence" criterion to give substance to
our "reasonable likelihood" standard. We
stated that for an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine our confidence
in the verdict.
Id. at 477 (footnotes omitted).
Admission of potentially prejudicial evidence is
harmless where evidence of guilt is overwhelming.

State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 477; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257
(Utah 1988); see also State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 295-96,
422 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1967) (finding defendant's threatening
remarks ineffectual in determining jury's verdict when considered
in light of all the evidence).

In State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440

(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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While there is little doubt that some
prejudice might result from the jury's being
informed, however briefly, that a defendant
had formerly been in jail, the prejudice must
be such that it is unfair. Utah Rule of
Evidence 103 provides in pertinent part
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is
affected...." Thus, defendant must make some
showing that the verdict was substantially
influenced by the challenged testimony. As
this Court said in State v. Malmrose, "\h]n
erroneous admission of evidence is treated as
harmless error absent a showing that it had a
substantial influence in bringing about the
verdict."
Id. at 448 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
In this case, four deputy sheriffs and another inmate
testified to defendant's acts and their results.

Three of those

witnesses testified as to defendant's remarks suggesting intent
(T. 110, 121, 123 and 161-62); four of the witnesses gave
evidence indicating that defendant's actions had caused the
flooding (T. Ill, 124, 140 and 164-86); all four officers
testified to the damage caused by the flooding (T. 71, 102, 125
and 133). Thus, the weight of evidence tending to prove
defendant's guilt was so substantial that any prejudice caused by
the admission of defendant's remarks pales by comparison.
Lastly, rule 12(b)(2) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides that motions concerning the admissibility of
evidence shall be made at least five days prior to trial and that
failure to object shall constitute a waiver.

State v. Loe, 732

P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987) (rule 12(d) invoked to support the
admission of an allegedly involuntary, incriminating statement as
to which defendant neither moved to suppress nor objected to at
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trial); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984) (finding
defendants waived any objections to the legality of their arrests
by failing to object prior to trial).
Defendant filed his motion in limine only fifteen (15)
minutes before trial (R. 28-9), and apparently on this account
the trial court declined to hear the motion. (See court's handwritten note on Motion in Limine, R. 28). Defendant claims in
his brief that he only learned of the State's intention to have
Cowan testify concerning defendant's offensive statements shortly
before trial (Appellant's Brief at 12, 16 and 21). The record is
silent on this matter.

Nonetheless, knowing that Cowan was a

witness to the events at issue, defendant had good reason to
believe that Cowan would be called to testify.

More importantly,

defendant knew from his presence at the preliminary hearing that
Nelson, in addition to Cowan, might testify to defendant's having
made the same offensive remarks at issue here.

(Preliminary

Hearing Transcript, hereafter "TB." 14). Thus, defendant was on
notice early in the proceedings of the alleged inflammatory
statements and had plenty of time to move to suppress those
statements.

On such facts, this Court should find that defendant

has waived his objection to the admitting into evidence of his
offensive statements.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO SEVER AND FOR CONTINUANCE BECAUSE
THEY WERE UNTIMELY FILED, FAILED TO SHOW THAT
CODEFENDANT WOULD TESTIFY FAVORABLY AND THAT
DEFENDANT AND CODEFENDANT HAD MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE AND IRRECONCILABLE DEFENSES.
The State substantially agrees with defendant's factual
statement regarding this matter (Appellant's Brief at 23-24).
Additional facts, especially those pertaining to the untimeliness
of defendant's filing his motions to sever and for continuance,
are developed in the latter part of the State's response on this
point.
Defendant argues that he was unconstitutionally denied
his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor because the trial court refused to grant his motions
(1) to sever defendant's trial from that of codefendant Adderman
2
and (2) for continuance.

His motions are founded exclusively on

his late discovery of a letter allegedly written by Adderman
absolving defendant of guilt (R. 18-25).

Even if the letter were

authentic, it would have been insufficient in consideration of
the other facts of this case to compel the granting of
Defendant grounds his right to severance in the right to
compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses made part of
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant has not cited,
and the State has not located, any authority supporting the
theory that a right to severance is embraced by the right to
compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses under the
cited provisions of either the Utah or United States
Constitutions. In fact, motions to sever the trials of jointly
charged defendants are presently governed by Utah Code Ann. § 778a-l (1990), a recodification of former section 77-35-9, and rule
9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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defendant's motions to sever and for continuance.
Rule 9(b) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
governs the joinder and severance of defendants at trial.

The

rule provides that defendants jointly charged out of acts
committed in the same criminal episode shall be jointly tried.
If a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder the court may grant a
3
severance of trials.
Applying rule 9, the Supreme Court stated, in Velarde:
Accordingly, severance is not available
as a matter of right. Instead, whether
severance is granted depends upon whether the
trial court determines that prejudice to the
defendant outweighs considerations of economy
and practicalities of judicial
administration, with doubts being resolved in
favor of severance. A denial of severance
will only be reversed by this Court if it is
affirmatively shown that a defendant's right
to a fair trial has been impaired.
Id. at 444-45. (footnote omitted).

See also State v. Collins,

612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980); and State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d,
1338, 1350 (Utah 1977) (quoting State v. Pass, 30 Utah 2d 197,
200, 515 P.2d 612, 614 (1973), for the general rule that joinder
of defendants is the procedure employed when "it appears that
persons were jointly involved in the commission of a crime so
that evidence against one is largely applicable to the
other...").
Here, all the evidence relating to the behavior of
defendants, the physical setting of the premises and their use,
the instrumentalities of causation (i.e. toilet paper in commodes
controlled by a button within each cell), and the flooding and
3
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, infra, Appendix A.
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subsequent damage to the jail, was fully applicable to each
defendant and necessary to the State's case against each.
Considerations of economy and the practicalities of judicial
administration clearly warranted a joint trial.
Defendant alludes to the possibility of defendants'
antagonistic defenses as a ground for severance (Appellant's
Brief, at 24-25).

Concerning antagonistic defenses the court in

Velarde, stated:
Antagonistic defenses alone are not
sufficient to require a separate trial. The
test of whether antagonistic defenses by two
defendants require severance is whether the
defenses conflict to the point of being
'.
irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. As
indicated above, however, a trial judge's
denial of severance will be reversed on
appeal only if the conflict in the
codefendants' respective positions at trial
was of such a nature that, considering all
the evidence in the case, the defendants were
denied a fair trial.
Id. at 445 (footnotes omitted).
On the basis of such a rule, defendant's assertion of
antagonistic defense is groundless.

First, defendant did not

specifically raise the issue of antagonistic defenses in his
pretrial motion to sever (R. 18-23).

In fact, defendant's motion

clearly indicated that Adderman's testimony, if given, would
support defendant's position.

Thus, the trial court could not

reasonably have granted a motion to sever based on defendants'
alleged antagonistic defenses.

Second, Adderman did not take the

stand, instead putting the State to its proof.

There is nothing

in the trial proceedings that suggests that either Adderman or
defendant adopted a theory that his own innocence was necessarily
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dependent on the guilt of his codefendant.

See State v. Hall,

712 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 1985) (motion to sever properly denied
where defendant's assertion of inconsistent defenses was
unsupported by testimony at trial).
Defendant also argues that because Adderman could not
be compelled to testify against himself he was unable to take
advantage of exculpating admissions in a letter allegedly written
by Adderman, and was therefore entitled to severance (T. 2-4; R.
21-23).

This argument is without legal merit.
A criminal defendant's right to severance based on the

alleged availability of his codefendant's exculpatory admissions,
while a case of first impression in Utah, has been reviewed in
the federal courts.

In United States v. Causey, 834 F. 2d 1277

(6th Cir. 1987), the court, presented with a fact pattern similar
to that in this case, stated:
Defendant Causey argues that even if he
could not comment on the failure of one or
the other defendants to testify, if tried in
a separate proceeding one of the codefendants
would have given exculpatory testimony.
However, a motion for severance on the ground
of absence of codefendant's testimony must be
accompanied by more than a basic, unsupported
contention that a separate trial would afford
the defendant exculpatory testimony. A
stringent test is to be employed in ruling on
a motion for severance in order to obtain a
codefendant's testimony. The defendant "must
demonstrate: (1) a bona fide need for the
testimony, (2) the substance of the
testimony, (3) its exculpatory nature and
effect and (4) that the codefendant will in
fact testify if the cases are severed,••
Id. at 1287 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

See also United

States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 590 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 957 (1985) (motion to sever denied where
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defendant failed to file affidavit satisfying prerequisites for
severance); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1446 (9th
Cir. 1985) (motion to sever denied where codefendants gave only
conditional promise to testify at severed trial).

These

decisions show that the trial court must receive certain
guaranties that favorable testimony will actively be developed at
a later trial before granting a motion to sever.
Here, defense counsel's Verified Motion To Sever (R.
18-23) did not assert that defendant would call Adderman to
testify, that Adderman would testify, or that his testimony would
be favorable.

Nor might defendant rely on Adderman's letter,

purportedly exculpating defendant, since it could not have been
4
admitted unless Adderman testified at trial.
On these facts the
court properly denied defendant's motions to sever and for
continuance (T. 2-4).
Defendant also suggests that, with respect to both his
motions to sever and to continue, he was prejudiced by the
State's delivery of Adderman's allegedly exculpatory letter on
The letter is hearsay under the basic definition. Utah R.
Evid. 801(c). However, under subsection (d)(1) it would not be
hearsay, and thereby admissible, jLf Adderman took the stand. See
Appendix A. In this case Adderman refused to take the stand, and
so the letter was inadmissible under this provision.
Also, on the theory that Adderman's refusal to take the
stand would make him "unavailable", the letter would still be
inadmissible under rule 804(b)(3);
A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
In this case the letter's authenticity was uncorroborated.
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March 9, 1990, only five days before trial, following two prior
discovery requests. The suggestion is without merit.
The prosecution has a continuing duty to disclose all
relevant evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16.

However, an error warrants reversal only if

it appears that without the error "there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result to the defendant."

State

v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (defendant prejudiced by
prosecution's failure to disclose crucial witnesses).

See also

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 1985) (prosecutor's
failure to disclose witness not prejudicial error when weighed
against substantial evidence tending to incriminate).
In this case, the State's delivery of the letter five
days before trial may be a deviation from procedure, but it is
utterly irrelevant in this context.

In Knight, and Carter on

which defendant relies, the defendant was compromised by being
confronted with the unanticipated testimony of witnesses whose
trial appearance the prosecution had not disclosed.

Here, in

contradistinction, defendant was not confronted with any
surprising testimony as a result of the State's "tardy"
disclosure.

Defendant simply received information, of doubtful

authenticity, that clearly would not be used by the State at
trial.

In fact, the prosecutor did deliver th€> requested letter
5
only 3 days after it was first requested.

See R. 19 and Appellant's discovery request of March 6, 1990,
Appendix at 34.
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To the extent that defendant claims Adderman's letter
supports his motion to sever, he is also mistaken (T. 2-4).
There was no evidence presented to the trial court that the
letter was authentic or that Adderman would testify.

Thus the

letter was insufficient in providing the trial court with the
assurances prerequisite to granting a motion to sever.
Causey, 834 F.2d at 1257.

See

Further, even if the trial court did

grant defendant a severance the letter might still be
inadmissible, i.e., Adderman might still have concerns about
being tried on additional charges, and so invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination.

In that case the letter again could

not be introduced into evidence.

Such speculations about the

possibility of favorable evidence are not enough to support the
granting of a severance.

Dickey, 736 F.2d at 590.

For all these

reasons defendant was not prejudiced by the State's "tardy"
disclosure.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVINED LEGISLATIVE
INTENT AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES "INJURY TO A
PUBLIC JAIL" IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTION.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-418 (1990) provides:
Every person who willfully and
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or
otherwise destroys or injures any public jail
or other place of confinement is guilty of a
felony of the third degree.
No Utah appellate court has interpreted section 76-6418; however, the general interpretative provision of the

See discussion of rules 801(d)(1) and 804(b)(3), supra, n.4.
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Criminal Code, Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-106 (1990) provides some
assistance:
The rule that a penal statute is to be
strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provisions, or any offense
defined by the laws of this state. All
provisions of this code and offenses defined
by the laws of this state shall be construed
according to the fair import of their terms
to promote justice and to effect the objects
of the law and general purposes of Section
76-1-104. '
A statute will be interpreted according to its plain meaning
giving effect to the legislative intent.

State v. Jones, 735

P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. Ct. 1987).8
7
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-104 (1990) provides, in pertinent
part:
The provisions of this code shall be
construed in accordance with these general
purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of
offenses.
o

In Jones, 735 P.2d 399, appellant sought a reversal of her
conviction of child abuse or, at least, a reduction to a
conviction of a less serious offense. In support, she argued
that "serious physical injury" referred to an individual act of
abuse, whereas the lesser offense of inflicting "physical injury"
included multiple acts, more applicable to her case. In
rejecting this argument the court stated:
[0]ne of the fundamental rules
of statutory construction is
that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in
light of the general purpose it
was intended to serve; and
should be so interpreted and
applied as to accomplish that
objective. In order to give the
statute the implementation which
will fulfill its purpose, reason
and intention sometimes prevail
over technically applied
literalness.
Andrus

v. Allred,

17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404
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Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied
his request for a jury instruction in which culpable "injury" to
a jail must be damage of equal gravity or consequence to
"breaking down"/ "pulling down" or "destroying" a jail or other
place of confinement (R. 38; Appendix B).

In support, he seeks

to import into this case a semantic analysis, undertaken by
another court to determine legislative intent of an unrelated
statute.
Defendant's reliance on State in the Interest of
J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), to determine legislative
intent is entirely inapposite to this case.

There the statute

first set forth specific, prohibited conduct, separated by the
disjunctive "or" from the statute's second part, condemning
conduct in generalized terms but expressed in a phrase having
only one operative term.
In contradistinction, section 76-8-418 has two
operative terms in the disjunctive, "destroys or injures". These
g
terms have substantially different meanings.
The differing
definitions necessarily refer to different levels of prohibited
8

Cont. P.2d, 972, 974 (1965). To limit the
Definition of "serious physical injury" to
one individual "injury" in the literal sense
would thwart the major purpose of the act,
which is to curb the increase in child abuse
by imposing stiffer penalties on child
abusers.
Id. at 402.
g
"Injure" - to inflict material damage or loss on. Synonyms harm, hurt, damage, impair, mar, spoil. Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1164 (1971).
"Destroy" - To ruin completely or to injure or mutilate beyond
possibility of use, or by tearing, breaking, burning, erosion,
etc. Synonyms - demolish, annihilate, dismantle, raze.
T u ft4
"" "
* *
--^"*i nirtionarv 710 (2nd ed. 1938).

damage.

Therefore, the statute, on its terms, makes criminal a

broad range of damage, from "marring" or "spoiling" to
"annihilation".

Thus, the trial court was again accurate in

recognizing that the level of damage in the jail was an "injury"
under section 76-8-418 (T. 181-82, 230).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION: (1) GIVEN THE COURT'S REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE AND GIVEN THE
EVIDENCE, THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE ACQUITTED
DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE AND
CONVICTED HIM OF THE INCLUDED OFFENSE; (2)
DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE
RELATED TO HIS REQUESTED CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
INSTRUCTION.
Due process entitles a defendant to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.

625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984).
But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the evidence
presented at trial.
1983).

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah

Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an instruction

on a lesser included offense, the trial court is obligated to
give the requested instruction only where:
there is a 'rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included
offense.'
Id. at 159.

It is not sufficient that the evidence simply

provides a basis to acquit of the greater offense, it must
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"simultaneously" provide a rational basis for the jury to convict
of the lesser.

State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984);

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983),
In the instant case criminal mischief would appear to
be a lesser included offense of injury to a jail*

However, the

question before the trial court was whether, based on the
evidence, there was a rational basis on which the jury could
acquit the defendant of injury to a jail and convict him of
criminal mischief (T. 231). To properly make such a
determination, the court was obligated to view the evidence in
the light most favorable to defendant and then, applying an
evidence based standard, evaluate if a rational basis for
acquittal of the charged offense and conviction of the included
offense existed.

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 532; State v.

Baker, 671 P.2d at 157.

In performing this evaluation, the trial

court properly denied defendant's requested instruction.
First, the trial court recognized that a "jail" or
"other place of confinement" included areas secondary and
incidental to the caring and processing of prisoners (T. 182,
instruction No. 6, R. 46, Appendix B). All the evidence showed,
without exception, damage only to the "jail" as so recognized.
Second, the trial court also recognized that essentially any kind
of damage to the jail would constitute an "injury" (T. 182). The
There is no Utah authority on this point. However, the State
concedes that the first prong of the Baker test is satisfied.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. There is overlap in the
statutory elements: (1) both statutes provide for every possible
degree of damage and (2) "property of another", pursuant to
section 76-6-106, would encompass the term "public jail or other
place of confinement" pursuant to section 76-8-418.
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evidence showed, without exception, that the jail had sustained
both "injury" and "destruction" by any definition of those terms.
Therefore, the court properly reasoned that if the jury had
acquitted defendant of injury to a jail it would necessarily have
acquitted him of criminal mischief (T. 231). On such finding
defendant was not entitled to the lesser included instruction.
Finally, defendant's requested instruction was improper
in form.

The instruction required that damage supportive of

guilt be $500.00 or less (R. 39, Appendix B).

There was no

evidence at trial as to the amount of damage sustained, and
defendant did not offer evidence of damage in any amount.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A FREE
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT WAS AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THIS STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IS (1) PROCEDURALLY
DEFECTIVE AND (2) WITHOUT MERIT SINCE A
SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENT IN THE FORM OF A TAPE
RECORDING WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM.
On appeal, defendant alleges that the trial court's
denial of his Verified Motion for Order for Production of
Transcripts ("Motion") is a violation of his federal and state
constitutional and statutory rights.

His arguments on this point

are a veritable shotgun blast of unsupported assignments of
error.

Specifically, defendant alleges violations of due process

and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution; denial of the rights of confrontation and effective
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah
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Constitution; and violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-1 and 7732-5 (1990) r providing for county assistance to indigent
defendants.

Excepting defendant's claim to rights as an indigent

on equal protection grounds, these assignments of error are
either improperly preserved or presented on appeal and are
substantially without merit.
A. DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ARE
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE ON APPEAL.
1.

Issue Raised First Time on Appeal.

In State in Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), the Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle of appellate
review that matters not raised at the trial
level cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal• • • •
Moreover, this principle applies equally to
constitutional challenges not presented
below, but raised subsequently on appeal.
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge
not given opportunity to rule on issues of constitutionality);
see also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985)
(failure to raise particular ground for suppressing evidence
precludes consideration of appeal on that ground).
In this case, defendant's Motion stated only that a
transcript of the preliminary hearing was essential to his
defense and that the court had determined him to be indigent and
had appointed counsel (R. 11-13).

The Motion was not accompanied

by any memorandum indicating statutory or constitutional support
for the request.

At the hearing the trial court pointed out that

defendant had not stated a reason for his need of the transcript.
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In response, defense counsel stated only that he had taken
insufficient notes and that he needed the transcript to prepare
for trial.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the Motion for

failure to demonstrate some special need (TA. 9-11).

During the

hearing defense counsel stated no statutory or constitutional
grounds in support of the Motion upon which the trial court would
have had the opportunity to rule.
2.

Failure to Specify Error and Cite to the Record

Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, state,
in pertinent part;
References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript,
or to pages of any statement of the evidence
or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled in numerous instances that an
appellant's failure to cite to the record in his brief is ground
for assuming regularity in the proceedings and correctness in the
judgment appealed from.

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah

1986); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).

In State

v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985), the court noted that
defendant's failure to specify objectionable evidence and to cite
to the record was in itself grounds for affirming the trial
court's ruling.
3.

Defendant's Arguments are Not Briefed

The Utah Supreme Court has declined to review unbriefed
assignments of error even where constitutional issues were
raised.

See State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989)

(court addresses only federal constitutional claim of denial of
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confrontation where defendant failed to separately brief his
claim under article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution); State v. Earlf 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986)
(court addresses search and seizure issue under fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution alone where state
constitutional analysis unbriefed); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d
1341, 1344 (Utah 1989) (court declines to rule on alleged
unconstitutionality of statute under article I, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution where defendant fails to support argument with
legal analysis),11

In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah

1988), the defendant claimed both federal and state
constitutional violations, but did not argue that the analysis of
his right to self representation would be different under article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution than that under the sixth
amendment to the federal constitution.

In declining to undertake

a state constitutional analysis, the court stated:
Unless the error is manifest on the record,
not only must it be raised, but on argument
must be briefed. This Court will not engage
in constructing arguments out of whole cloth
on behalf of defendants in capital cases.
Id. at 1247 n.5 (emphasis added).
Defendant's brief on this issue cites a host of alleged
state and federal constitutional violations without the citation
of a single authority.

Defendant's failure to precisely specify

the substance of his claims, unsupported by authority, leaves
both the State and this Court without guidance in formulating a
11

But see State v. Cookf 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (court
reviews pro se defendant's appeal to protect valuable
constitutional right to jury trial, improperly denied).
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response.

Defendant's undeveloped arguments suggest that his

claims are without substance.

Indeed, the State believes that

defendant's claims, excepting his right as an indigent to a
transcript on equal protection grounds, are inappropriate and
without sufficient substance to require hardly more than a
commensurate response. 12
Right to Confrontation - "[t]he right to confrontation in the
popular sense - means a 'face to face' meeting. Tacon v.
Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 353 (1973); see also State v. Anderson,
612 P.2d 778, 782-86 (Utah 1980) (denial of right of
confrontation harmless where prosecution presented testimony of
material witness at a preliminary hearing by extrajudicial
affidavit); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-06 (Utah 1987)
(erroneous denial of opportunity to cross examine accomplice for
biased testimony a harmless infringement on right of
confrontation). Here, all the State's evidence* was offered
through in-court witnesses, each of whom defendant had an
unfettered opportunity to examine at every stage of the
proceeding.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - At the outset defendant does
not claim that counsel was ineffective, counsel being the same at
both trial and on appeal. The real thrust of defendant's
argument is that the trial court rendered his counsel ineffective
by denying him access to the preliminary hearing transcripts. In
this sense defendant has really assigned error to the wrong
source and thereby chosen an inappropriate theory.
In any event, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel will be successful only if defendant can prove that "(1)
his counsel rendered an objectively deficient performance,
demonstrated by specific acts or omissions; and (2) counsel's
error prejudiced defendant." State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 668,
689 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The burden of proving these elements
is on the defendant. State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 704 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). M[T]he claim may not be speculative, but must be
a demonstrative reality. . . . " State v. Frame?, 723 P.2d 401,
405 (Utah 1986). Defendant cannot show prejudice here: (1) the
evidence for conviction was overwhelming (Appellee's Brief, pages
12-13); and (2) defendant makes no allegation that counsel's
performance was actually deficient.
Violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-1 et seq (1990) - Evidently,
title 77, Chapter 32, providing for counsel to indigent
defendants is a codification of constitutionally guaranteed
rights to counsel, and does not enlarge the scope of those
constitutional rights. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247-
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Concerning the denial of his Motion, defendant has
failed to specify how the lack of a preliminary hearing
transcript rendered him ineffective or precluded confrontation.
His brief contains not a single reference to the transcripts of

Cont. 48. Further, the applicable provision, § 77-32-1(3)
limits facilities to be provided an indigent defendant to those
that are "necessary." See also Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah
2d 6, 11, 447 P.2d 189, 192 (Utah 1968) (limiting defendant's
right to a state paid investigator pursuant to predecessor
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-1 (1953 as amended)); accord
State v. Cote, 27 Utah 2d 24, 26, 492 P.2d 986, 987 (Utah 1972).
Section 77-32-5 specifies only the court which shall bear the
expenses of transcripts without determining the right to a
transcript.
Denial of Due Process - A trial court's denial of a preliminary
hearing transcript has been recognized as a denial of due
process; however, where the right to a free transcript is made by
an indigent defendant, courts have invariably analyzed the issue
on equal protection grounds. United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d
60, 63 (10th Cir. 1974) (indigent defendant's right to free
transcript, claimed under the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution, evaluated on equal protection grounds).
In this case, defendant fails to clearly identify the
precise constitutional provisions relied on: In his Statement of
the Issues he claims a due process violation without identifying
the particular constitutional provisions relied on. (Appellant's
Brief at 2). Amendments five and fourteen to the United States
Constitution and article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
all providing for the right of due process are set out in the
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes Ordinance and
Rules section (Appellant's Brief at 3-4). However, defendant
refers only to equal protection in his Summary of the Argument,
Fifth Issue (Appellant's Brief at 19-20). Finally, in his Detail
of the Argument, Fifth Issue, defendant makes no claim of a
violation of his due process rights under either the Utah or the
United States constitution.
In view of the predilection of courts to review an
indigent defendant's right to a preliminary hearing transcript on
equal protection grounds, and defendant's indifferent claim of a
due process violation, this Court may reasonably decline to
review defendant's due process claim. See State v. Tuttle, 780
P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989) (defendant's failure to brief claims
of denial of rights to confrontation and due process pursuant to
article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, precludes
appellate review).
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either the hearing on his Motion or the preliminary hearing,
requested by defendant and made part of the record on appeal.
The reasonable inference is that the events of those hearings do
not support his claim that lack of a preliminary hearing
transcript prejudiced him in preparing for or conducting trial.
B. FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE TAPE RECORDING OF
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENT OF A TRANSCRIPT
A criminal defendant's right to a transcript of a
preliminary hearing for the purpose of trial preparation has been
recognized in both Utah and federal courts.

See State v. Neeley#

748 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Utah 1988); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40, 42 (1967); Gardner v. United States, 407 P. 2d 1266 (D.C.
Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969).

That right was further

developed in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), the
leading case providing for an indigent's right to a transcript or
its equivalent on equal protection grounds.
In Britt, the defendant's first trial ended in a
mistrial.

In order to prepare for his next trial, defendant

filed a motion alleging that he was indigent and requesting a
free transcript of his first trial.

The trial court denied the

motion and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.

In

upholding the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed its prior decisions regarding an indigent's right to a
free transcript, stating:
[t]his Court has identified two factors that
are relevant to the determination of need:
(1) the value of the transcript to the
defendant in connection with the appeal or
trial for which it is sought, and (2) the
availability of alternative devices that
-32-

would fulfill the same functions as a
transcript.
Id, at 228 (emphasis added).

Focusing on the second element the

court noted that the trial took place in a small town in which
the court reporter, apparently a good friend of all the local
lawyers, was also reporting the second trial. Apparently, the
reporter would have been available to read back his notes of the
first trial well in advance of the second trial upon defense
counsel's informal request.

On such grounds the court held that

the trial court had not committed error in denying defendant's
request because the defendant conceded that he had available "an
informal alternative which appears to be substantially equivalent
to a transcript."

j[d. at 230.

Britt has been followed in a number of jurisdictions
where the facts justify the application of its somewhat narrow
holding.

See State v. Kelley, 209 Kan. 699, 498 P.2d 87 (Kan.

1972) (full access to reporter's notes constituted a fair and
adequate alternative to a transcript where trial counsel, same as
in preliminary hearing, acknowledged his recollection of the
testimony);

United States v. Talbot, 454 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir.

1972) (access to reporter's notes and partial transcript an
equivalent of a full transcript).
In this case the preliminary hearing, of which
defendant sought a transcript, was heard in the Seventh Circuit
Court, Carbon County. These proceedings were tape recorded (R.
13
7).
The critical inquiry in this case is whether those tape
The record indicates that the preliminary hearing was recorded
on tape numbers 90-10/B510, 90-11 and 90-12/E 1200.
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recordings were an alternative substantially equivalent to a
transcript.
Relying on Britt, courts have adopted a variety of
approaches in determining the adequacy of tape recordings as
substitutes for transcripts.

In some cases courts have examined

a wide variety of factors bearing on the defendant's capacity to
adequately present his case without the traditionally relied-upon
transcript.

Thus, in Kirk v. State, 555 P.2d 85 (Okla. Crim.

App. 1976), the court held that tape recordings were an
acceptable alternative to a completed transcript where defendant
had available the court reporter's notes and a partially
completed transcript.

See also United States v. Vandivere, 579

F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1979) (tape recordings adequate substitute
where same counsel represented defendant at preliminary hearing
and trial, separated by 18 days, and trial simple and with little
conflict in testimony).
In other cases the tape recording, as an advocate's
trial instrument, is assumed to be a sufficient substitute for a
transcript without any compensating factors, the inquiry
explicitly or implicitly focusing only on the audibility of the
tape recording.

Thus, in Brinlee v. State, 543 P.2d 744 (Okla.

Crim. App. 1975), the court ruled that where defendant
acknowledged that most of the tape recording was audible and
there were only a few places where words might be misunderstood
and the court, too, after listening, considered the tape
"passable," the tape recording was held to be substantially
equivalent to a transcript.

See also Commonwealth v. Dean, 348
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Pa. Super. 1, 501 A.2d 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (defendant's own
tape recording of preliminary hearing held substantial equivalent
of the transcript).

Finding a tape recording of a preliminary

hearing more than merely adequate, the New Mexico Supreme Court
found tape recordings to be distinctly superior to the
traditional transcript in evaluating witness testimony, preparing
for trial and examining witnesses at trial.

State ex rel. Moreno

v. Floyd, 85 N.M. 699, 706, 516 P.2d 670, 677 (N.M. 1973). 14
Opposed to Moreno, as it pertains to the trial use of tape
recordings, is United States v. Jonas, 540 F.2d 566 (7th Cir.
1976). There, defendant, convicted of receiving, concealing and
storing treasury bills, moved the district court for a free
transcript of his first trial to prepare for his new trial. The
district court denied the motion, offering instead to make
available its trial notes and the tape recordings for preparation
and impeachment purposes. The seventh circuit held that "[t]he
tape recordings did not allow counsel to adequately prepare for
the second trial and were not an adequate substitute for a
transcript for purposes of impeachment." .Id. at 569.
Jonas differs from the instant case in particulars that
were clearly determinative of its holding. First, defendant was
represented by different counsel at each trial separated by
approximately two and one-half months. Second, and most
significantly, the tape recordings were available only during
court hours in the office of the court reporter.
In holding as it did Jonas also allowed for possible
exceptions pertinent to this case:
By our decision today we do not
establish a per se rule that the government
must provide a transcript following a mistrial. Under Britt there still may be
available "an informal alternative which
appears to be substantially equivalent to a
transcript." However, in the overwhelming
majority of cases we do not perceive that
tape recordings or judicial notes will
suffice. Admittedly there may be some trials
where the testimony is short, simple and
straightforward so that the preparation of a
transcript would be unnecessary.
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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In touting that superiority the Moreno court noted that
an "[audio recording] adds an important and significant dimension
to the understanding and evaluation of the spoken words."
P.2d at 673.

516

The court supported that observation by pointing

out that the court had long recognized that the trier of fact,
with its first-hand contact with witnesses, was better able to
determine witness credibility and the weight to be given
testimony than an appellate court limited to the written record
of proceedings.

j[d. at 674.

In sum, while opposing authority exists, the trend
appears to be that freely accessible audible tape recordings of a
preliminary hearing, in relatively simple cases where the
defendant is represented by the same counsel throughout the
proceedings, constitute an alternative substantially equivalent
to a written transcript.
Notwithstanding the substantial equivalence of the
preliminary hearing tape recordings to a written transcript, and
its ready availability, the trial court's denial of defendant's
Motion may have been an abuse of discretion.

Here, in response

to defendant's Motion, the trial court demanded a showing of
unusual need, expressing a concern about needless expense of
taxpayer money (TA. 9-11).

While these concerns are valid they

are evidently not sufficient to deny an indigent defendant access
to a transcript as a satisfactory alternative.'15 Furthermore, in
15
Britt, 404 U.S. at 228, states that United States Supreme
Court cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant
of a transcript of prior proceedings without requiring a showing
of particularized need. However, in considering a defendant's
need for a transcript on appeal, the United States Supreme Court
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all cases the State has reviewed considering this issue, the
trial court has at least presented an option in lieu of the
requested transcript.

Where the acceptability of the proffered

tape recordings was undetermined by the trial court, the
reviewing court has remanded the case for findings.

See Morgan

Cont. stated in the seminal case, Griffin v. Illinois/ 351
U.S. 12 (1956):
We do not hold that Illinois must purchase a
stenographer's transcript in every case where
a defendant cannot buy it. The [Illinois]
Supreme Court may find other means of
affording adequate and effective appellate
review to indigent defendants. For example,
it may be that bystanders' bills of
exceptions or other methods of reporting
trial proceedings could be used in some
cases.
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Considering the same issue the court in Draper v.
Washington/ 372 U.S. 487 (1963)/ expressed the opinion that where
portions of the transcript were not germane to the issue on
appeal the state need not waste its funds by providing what was
unnecessary for an adequate appellate review. jEd. at 495-96.
See also Morgan v. Graham/ 497 P.2d 464, 467 (Okla. Crim. App.
1972) ("costs to the state, while no yardstick of a defendant's
rights, is still a practical consideration").
In Vandivere, 579 F.2d 1240f 1243 (10th Cir. 1979)/ the
tenth circuit found tape recordings of a preliminary hearing
satisfactory alternatives to the written transcript. In so
holding, the court relied partly on rule 5.1f Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, providing for a method by which a defendant
might secure a tape recording of the preliminary examination. In
support, the court quoted the advisory committee as follows: "The
new rule is designed to eliminate delay and expense occasioned by
the preparation of transcripts where listening to the tape
recording would be sufficient." Ibid, (citation omitted).
In Utah, the preservation of circuit court proceedings
is provided for by law. CJA Rule 4-201(2)(A). A tape may be
duplicated for $5.00, unless the requesting party is impecunious.
CJA Rule 4-202(8)(B) (emphasis added). One can only assume that
rules 4-201(2) (A) and 4-202(8)(B) were designed with the same
expense saving idea in mind as that of their federal
counterparts.
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v. Graham, 497 P.2d 464, 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (remanded
for evidentiary hearing to determine the value of the transcript
to the defendant and the availability of alternative devices
which would fulfill the same functions as a transcript).
However, the trial court's denial of the preliminary
transcript may not have been error at all, under the
circumstances of this case.

In Britt, the United States Supreme

Court concluded that the trial court's denial of the transcript
of the defendant's first trial was not error where the court
reporter would have at any time prior to the second trial read
back his notes of the first trial "if counsel had simply made an
informal request,"

Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

In this case, the tape recordings of the preliminary
hearing were available for copying at no charge* to defendant.
The transcriptions of those tape recordings, made pursuant to
defendant's request in support of his appeal, demonstrate that
they were very audible, preserving virtually all the testimony.
Additionally, almost all the surrounding factors supporting the
use of tape recordings of prior proceedings in lieu of written
xu

CJA Rule 4-201(2)(A) and 4-202(8)(B), supra, n.15.

17
The transcript of the preliminary hearing is 159 pages in
length. There are 19 notations of "inaudible" (Preliminary
Hearing Transcript Vols. I and II, "TB." 19, 20, 24, 26. 35, 75,
76, 82, 86, 90, 95, 97, 104, 107, 112, 113, 123 and 130). These
notations indicate omissions representing only a tiny fraction of
the entire testimony. It is apparent from the flow of testimony
that in each instance of inaudibility only a few words at most
are omitted and that no significant testimony was lost, the
meaning being readily reconstructed from the surrounding text.
The entire closing argument of all parties and the court's review
of the evidence to determine the existence of probable cause is
completely intact.
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transcripts are present here: (1) defendant was represented by
the same counsel at all stages of the proceedings; (2) the
preliminary hearing lasted only one afternoon (R. 5 and 7); (3)
the testimony at trial lasted little more than half a day (R. 3335); and (4) the preliminary hearing and trial were separated by
only seven weeks.

The only factors missing are the trial court's

possibly suggesting an alternative to a transcript and
defendant's not conceding his access to a substantial equivalent
of a transcript.

See Brittf 404 U.S. at 228-30. Neither of

these factors are relevant to this case.
Defendant would have known from his own experience and
observation, resulting from his every appearance in circuit
court, that the proceedings were being tape recorded.

No

suggestion from the trial court should have been necessary to
alert defendant to this possibility.
More importantly, defendant, in the diligent pursuit of
his own defense, should have listened to the tape recordings and
made copies if he felt it important.

See Jackson v. Dabney, 645

P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) (attorney required to represent
client's interests with competence and diligence).

At least one

jurisdiction has made a defendant's exercise of due diligence a
prerequisite to obtaining a copy of a transcript of his
preliminary hearing.

Kirk, 555 P.2d at 87 (indigent defendant

who had ample opportunity to take advantage of tape recording of
preliminary hearing could not contend that transcript of
preliminary hearing was not available).

Here, following the

trial court's denial of his request for a free transcript,
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defendant failed to take the obvious course of listening and
copying the tape recordings of the preliminary hearing*

On such

facts defendant cannot now claim that the trial court erred when
it denied him a free copy of a written transcript of the
preliminary hearing. 18
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j£

day of March, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Ultimately, the trial court's ruling was proper, for while
defendant need not demonstrate any unusual need for a transcript,
as here required by the court, defendant nonetheless had
available a substantially equivalent alternative. "On appeal
[the Supreme Court] may affirm the trial court's decision on any
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah
1985).
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-8-418

76-8-418. Damaging jails.
Every person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, or
otherwise destroys or iqjures any public jail or other place of confinement is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-418, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-8-418.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct
or in the same criminal episode.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise,
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of
separate counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other
relief as justice requires.
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the
motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by
defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any
statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence
at the trial.

Rule 12. Motions.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from such waiver.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(19V1> except that "surprise*' is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah

1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference,
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him; or

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such actios as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.

Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion.

UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-201. Record of proceedings.
Intent:
To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceedings in all courts of record.
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(2) Electronic recording systems.
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Juvenile Court, and Circuit Court and before
Court Commissioners shall be maintained by a suitable electronic recording system as approved by the Council.

Rule 4-202. Records dissemination.
Intent:
To adopt uniform guidelines for the dissemination of information from court
records.
To provide definitions and classification of records maintained by the judicial branch of government.
To provide guidelines for the courts in permitting access to records without
impairing the necessary day to day activities of the court.
Applicability:
This rule applies to all courts of record and not of record and the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Juvenile Court Act and the Juvenile Court
Board's rule primarily govern access to juvenile court records. However, this
rule applies to Juvenile Court records where the Juvenile Court Act and
Board rule are silent with regard to the specific writing or record.
Statement of the Rule:
(8) Except in cases where the requesting party is impecunious, costs will be
assessed as follows:
(B) The charge for tape duplication will be $5.00 per tape.
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KEITH H. CHIARA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
37 East Main St
P. 0. Box 955
Price, UT 84501
(801) 637-7011
Attorney for Defendant
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jF*n«^\fX*DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PIai nti ff ;

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ,
Defendant -

Cr i m in a1 No. 90-3

COMES NOW the Defendant and requests that the Court give the
requested jury i nstructions„
DATED this 15th day of March, 1990.

KEITH H. CHIARA
Attorney at Law

DELIVERED

a copy of the foregoing Requested

Jury

Instruc-

tions to Gene Strate, Carbon County Attorney, 123 East Main
Price, Utah, 84501, this 15th day of March, 1990.

St.,

INSTRUCTION No._
/
are instructed that i f you -find from the evidence

that

damage

was done to the jail or other place o-f confinement,

that

before

that damaqe is considered sufficient to be considered

You

"injury"

to

the jail, that damage must be o-f equal

consequence with "breaking down", "pulling down" or

gravity

or

"destroying"

a jail or other place o-f confinement.

it

an

ui

* •. f j f

INSTRUCTION No.

You

a.r^

instructed that if you do not find

the

Defendant

guilty of injuring jails, you may find the Defendant guilty of
lesser

included offense of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class

A

a

Misde-

meanor.
To find the Defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief, you

must

beyond a reasonable doubt, the following elements of

that

find,
crime:
1-

That the Defendant, on or about the 7th day of November,

2.

Intentionally damaged, or defaced the property of anoth-

1989,

er,
3-

The

dollar amount of the damage was not shown

by

any

e v i d e n c e , t o b e (nor e t h an $• 5 0 0 - 0 0 „

,/ J
fc/lr

/t^\
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBOM jCOUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
)
1

STATE OF UTAH,

COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY

Plaintiff,

vs

;

GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ,
JERRY LEE ADDERMAN,

|i
]i

Criminal No. 90-3
Criminal No. 90-4

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
The Defendants, GREGORY LYNN JAIMEZ and JERRY LEE
ADDERMAN,

are accused by an Information filed in this Court

by the County Attorney for Carbon County, State of Utah, of
having committed the following crimes:
Count I

INJURING A JAIL, in violation of Section
76-8-418, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in that
the said defendants, on or about November 7,
1989, at Carbon County, State of Utah, did
injury to a public jail or other place of
confinement.

